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The concept of property is expanding both in scope, through the 
creation of novel forms of property, including claims to cultural property, 
and in scale, ranging from the molecular in the patenting of genetic material 
to the planetary in the establishment of markets for trading carbon and other 
pollutants. Yet these claims are simultaneously being called into question in 
debates about the appropriate limits to property regimes.
There are familiar examples of these debates. In The mystery o f capital, 
the Peruvian economist de Soto (2000) attributes the genius of capitalism to 
its ability to convert all things into property, and thereby into capital. He 
endorses private property and the development of the legal instruments that 
regulate the mortgaging of assets, reconfiguring the world in monetary terms 
(see Pietz 1999: 62). Yet to mortgage assets is also to risk their alienation, 
and in the Third World contexts about which de Soto writes, objections to 
the privatisation of land ownership are based on the recognition that 
customary forms of land tenure and informal strategies for securing access 
to land can provide a measure of security to the poor in an otherwise uncertain 
world. These concerns were highlighted by recent protests in Papua New 
Guinea against plans to privatize land holdings, the result of World Bank 
structural adjustment policies, which led to the deaths of several students.1
The three debates about property limits that I consider in this article 
address events in Papua New Guinea, where people make claims on one
1. Comparable examples from elsewhere in the region abound (e.g., van Meijl and von 
Benda-Beckmann 1999).
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another through transactions carried out in languages and practices that 
challenge many of the assumptions that underlie Euro-American property 
regimes (see Strathem and Hirsch, 2004). The first case considers the patent 
awarded for a cell line extracted from a Hagahai man from the Highlands 
region. The second case examines the relationship between property and 
pollution downstream from the Ok Tedi copper and gold mine in Western 
Province. The third case evaluates the response of public intellectuals in 
Papua New Guinea to international debates on cultural property rights. These 
examples cover a range of seemingly incommensurate objects, including 
genetic material, pollution and culture. The associated debates took place in 
a variety of forums, including international deliberations carried out through 
the internet, legal claims argued before the Australian courts and discussions 
among scholars, politicians and journalists in Papua New Guinea. They 
incorporate a wide array of voices, including indigenous persons, 
anthropologists, lawyers, corporate executives and Nongovernmental 
Organizations (NGOs).2 My relationship to these cases also varies. While 
I was not involved in the Hagahai case, I have participated as both an 
ethnographer and an advocate for the communities affected by the Ok Tedi 
mine (Kirsch, 2002), and have also contributed to scholarly deliberations on 
cultural property rights in the Pacific (Kirsch, 2001a; 2001b).This article 
considers these debates about property limits in relation to controversial 
proposals to mobilize copyrights, patents and other legal instruments on 
behalf of indigenous communities by multilateral agencies, including United 
Nations Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). One impetus for these endeavors 
was the World Trade Organization’s imposition of Euro-American patent 
regimes on its member states through the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. Some NGOs have endorsed 
these proposals, while others have objected to them on various grounds, as 
I describe below.
2. It has been argued that the primary beneficiaries from cultural property rights debates 
have been the scholars and NGOs who have carved out a niche for their work in these 
arenas. Rabinow (2002: 143; see also 147 fn. 7) has criticized scholars for being unwilling 
to acknowledge their position in the larger “market” for ideas.
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As Euro-American conceptions of property gain currency through 
globalization, debates on property limits reveal the presence of other ideas that 
circulate along with property forms. These debates are commonly carried out 
in terms of concepts that are central to how Euro-Americans imagine themselves 
and the world, including particular ideas about the body, nature and culture. My 
argument is that debates about property limits perversely contribute to the 
establishment of these concepts in the place of local alternatives.
Property and the indigenous body
The first debate was concerned with the potential commodification 
of human bodies and body parts, including genetic material. It addressed a 
patent granted to scientists affiliated with the US National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) on March 14, 1996 for a cell line extracted from the blood of a 
Hagahai man from the Schrader Mountains in Papua New Guinea. It contained 
a variant of the human T-cell virus HTLV-1, which does not cause leukemia 
like other varieties of HTLV-1. The immortalized cell line had potential utility 
and economic value for the development of diagnostic tests and vaccines 
(Bhat, 1996: 30). While the patent conformed with NIH policy at the time, it 
was withdrawn a year later (Bhat, 1996: 30; Friedlaender, 1996: 22).
The medical anthropologist associated with the patent argued that it 
protected the economic interests of the Hagahai from whom the cell line was 
derived.3 Making these rights explicit was considered essential given the findings 
in the case of John Moore v. Regents of the University o f California (1991), in 
which an individual’s claim to a cell line derived from his tissue was rejected by 
the courts (Rabinow, 1996). Unlike Moore’s claim, which was based on his 
rights as an individual, the Papua New Guinea claim was made on behalf of the
3. Carol Jenkins was employed by Institution of Medical Research in Goroka. She was well 
known to the Hagahai through her biomedical research and her help in bringing medical 
aid to the community since 1983. Hagahai blood samples were sent to Gadjusek, a colleague 
of Jenkins at NIH who had previously been awarded a Nobel prize for his research on the 
fatal wasting disease kuru, which affected another Highlands group in Papua New Guinea 
during the 1950s (Anderson, 2000; Hirsch, 2004). Gadjusek and Jenkins were named on 
the US version of the patent along with a third colleague.
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Hagahai as a whole.The patenting of the Hagahai cell line was subsequently 
criticized by the Canadian NGO, Rural Advance Front International (RAF1).4 
RAFI focuses on the socioeconomic implications of new technologies, especially 
biotechnology. In particular, it opposes the patenting or licensing of all life- 
forms.5 RAFI noted that the Hagahai patent included the individual’s entire cell 
line, including his DNA. Following the logic of the Moore decision, RAFI argued 
that this genetic material no longer belonged to the man from whom it was 
extracted, but through the patent granted to NIH had become the property of 
the United States government. This led to their assertion that the scientists had 
“patented a human life”, initiating a global e-storm in which anthropologists, 
biologists and indigenous rights groups expressed their views on the appropriate 
limits to property regimes with respect to the human body and genetic material 
(Riordan, 1995; Taubes, 1995).6,7 The scientists associated with the patent 
disputed RAFTs allegation, explaining that the breadth of the patent was required 
because HTLV-1 cannot be supported outside of an immortalized cell line.8
RAFI the vampire slayer
Debates about the Hagahai patent coincided with RAFTs criticism of 
the proposed Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP), which critics 
dubbed the “vampire project”. This endeavor was designed to supplement
4. RAFI is now known as the ETC Group (http://www.rafi.org/main.asp).
5. See a lso R A FI’s criticism  of Brent B erlin ’s ethnobotany project among M ayan 
communities in Mexico (Belejack, 2001; Brown, 2003).
6 . The term “e-storm ” refers to a flurry o f electronic mail that moves rapidly through 
multiple networks of users and user-groups. It has the capacity to spread profligately in a 
very short period of time. Another famous anthropological e-storm was precipitated by 
the circulation of Terence Turner and Leslie Sponsel’s email warning about the publication 
of Tierney’s (2000) Darkness in El Dorado.
7. G reely (1998: 490), the Stanford law yer who chaired the N orth Am erican ethics 
subcom m ittee o f the Human Genom e D iversity  Project (HGDP), has argued that 
com parisons betw een the patenting  o f a gene or a part o f the genom e and the 
commodification of humanity muddle the distinction between genes and persons.
8 . Immortalisation refers to the process o f establishing a line of cells that can reproduce 
indefinitely outside o f the human body under laboratory conditions.
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lhe research of the Human Genome Project, which analyzed genetic material 
from a small number of individuals in mapping the human genome.9 The 
scientists who organized the HGDP sought genetic information from a broad 
sample of marginal or minority populations in which they expected to find 
the greatest genetic diversity (Weiss, 1996; Cunningham, 1998). Consonant 
with “ Last of the M ohicans” narratives that assume the eventual 
disappearance of indigenous peoples, the proponents of the HGDP claimed 
a particular “urgency” for their task because their target populations were 
“endangered” . These risks included physical threats to their survival and 
their assimilation into neighboring populations, either of which would diminish 
their value to geneticists (Lock, 1994: 605).10 This assumption contradicts 
indigenous narratives of survival and continuity, as well as the anthropological 
recognition that many indigenous communities are flourishing, even 
producing their own “ indigenized modernities” (Sahlins, 1999). The HGDP 
also exhibited many of the conceptual flaws which led to the “crisis of 
representation” that preoccupied North American cultural anthropology 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, including the assumption that indigenous 
communities can be studied under so-called “natural conditions” (Santos, 
2002: 90). By identifying “primitive isolates” as their unit of study, the 
scientists associated with the HGDP made questionable assumptions about 
the genetic homogeneity of these groups and the degree to which they are 
separate and different from neighboring populations.11 Their misuse of social 
science led to flawed claims about genetic diversity and natural science. 
Research that examines contemporary societies without taking their history,
9. The organizers o f the HGDP were primarily interested in human evolutionary history, 
asking, “who we are as a species and how we came to be” (Cavalli-Sforza in Lock 1994:603).
10. Hayden (1998) has questioned the political implications of representing organisms by 
their genes. If biodiversity is perceived solely in terms of DNA, is the threat of extinction 
of a population or species reduced to a problem of inform ation m anagement? The 
equation of organisms and their DNA might lead to the preservation of genetic information 
in lieu o f protecting endangered plants or animals, or providing assistance to human 
populations whose lives might be at risk (Hayden, 1998). Weiss (1996: 28) has disputed 
the claim that the HGDP values DNA at the expense of its carriers: “We cannot, and do 
not, think for a moment that the HGDP is a substitute for efforts to protect and enhance 
human populations everywhere, no matter how small or economically disadvantaged”.
11. Similar questions have been raised about the DECODE project in Iceland (Pálsson and 
Harõardóttir, 2002).
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mobility, and interactions with the members of other societies into account 
follows the problematic paradigm of viewing all indigenous peoples as “lost 
tribes” (Kirsch, 1997). The HGDP also ignored the contemporary politics 
of scientific encounters. The relationship between science and society has 
been increasingly subjected to political scrutiny, especially the claims of 
neutrality and objectivity axiomatically associated with scientific methods in 
the past (Santos, 2002: 96). Treating indigenous peoples as sources of 
information problematically relegates them and their bodies to the public 
domain, “ naturalizing” them in the process (Santos, 2002: 83). They are 
treated as objects of study rather than agents in their own right. Consequently 
one reason that the HGDP failed was because it was designed to practice 
“colonial science in a postcolonial world” (paraphrasing Marks, 1995: 72, 
cited in Cunningham, 1998: 205). Although the communities that would 
have been sampled by the HGDP may well have benefited from Western 
medicine in the past and consequently might be seen to have a reciprocal 
obligation to contribute to scientific research, the HGDP was viewed by 
critics as another initiative to transform biological material alienated from 
developing nations into intellectual property without providing appropriate 
recognition or recompense (Aoki, 1998; see also Ramos, 2000). While the 
scientists who proposed the HGDP privileged DNA as the tangible form in 
which biological diversity should be preserved, RAFI and other NGOs 
objecting to the project fetishised genetic material as a form of identity, 
leading them to consider DNA as a form of cultural property. In doing so, 
they invoked a new kind of threat to indigenous peoples, that foreign scientists 
and corporations might profit from their being, essence, or identity while 
simultaneously depriving them of something of value, the techno-scientific 
version of Frazer’s “sympathetic principle” of magic.
Bodies and ownership
Rabinow (2002: 140) has observed that multinational corporations 
and NGOs, despite their claims to occupy opposing positions on the political 
spectrum, may reinforce the same “view of the body, the self, ownership 
and truth”, including the supposition that genomes contain information which
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can be treated as property. Similarly, Strathern (2001:152) has noted that 
the language used in these debates “tends to universalize certain Euro- 
American assumptions about property and ownership”. In the debates about 
Hagahai DNA, however, the difference with the Moore case is instructive. 
Whereas claims about Euro-American bodies are made on the basis of 
individual rights, the rights of groups or populations are invoked with 
reference to indigenous bodies. The participants in the Hagahai debates 
followed the Euro-American assumption that property rights are held by 
individuals in the West, but collectively by indigenous peoples. The claim 
that the Hagahai represent a distinct biological population has an instructive 
social history. When several Hagahai men ventured into the Western Highlands 
town of Mt. Hagen in search of medical assistance in 1983, the media 
described them as members of a “lost tribe” (Kirsch, 1997).12 The patent on 
the Hagahai cell line subsequently naturalized their social status as a distinct 
population by suggesting that they possessed biological characteristics 
differentiating them from their neighbors. Their relative isolation became a 
key construct both socially in their identification as a “lost tribe” and biologically 
in the assumption that they were a distinct population (Jenkins, 1987). Given 
the probability that the Hagahai were exposed to the virus by a host from 
another population, the natural history of the variant of HTLV-1 may actually 
contradict their claim to being a “lost tribe”.13 There is no biological evidence 
to suggest that this T-cell virus is unique to the Hagahai; its distribution may
12. A Papua New Guinean anthropologist who visited the Hagahai shortly after their visit to 
Mt. Hagen concluded that, “these people were not a ‘lost tribe’, but a group which has kept 
very much to themselves for reasons other than ignorance of the world around them” 
(Mangi, 1988: 60). An expatriate anthropologist who subsequently carried out research 
with the Hagahai reached similar conclusions: “What is apparent is that the Hagahai, 
protected by physical and social barriers, remained relatively uninfluenced by outside forces 
until the early 1980s” (Boyd, 1996: 106). Yet the isolation of the Hagahai was far from 
complete. They had regular contact with their closest neighbors, the Pinai (Boyd, 1996:105). 
Thirty men out of a population of fewer than 300 had intermittently been employed on a 
nearby cattle station since the 1970s (Boyd, 1996: 131). The Hagahai actively contributed 
to the impression that they were very isolated in order to elicit sympathy and support 
(Jenkins in Fishlock, 1993: 20). Their claims were uncritically accepted by the PNG media, 
who reported the discovery of a “lost tribe” (Kirsch, 1997: 62-63).
13. An earlier application for a patent on another variant o f HTLV-1 from the Solomon 
Islands was subsequently withdrawn (Bhat, 1996: 30).
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extend to neighboring populations or other parts of the Highlands and can 
only be established through additional biological research. Whereas the 
anthropologist responsible for the patent argued that the Hagahai have property 
rights to the variant of HTLV-1 by virtue of their separation and difference 
from neighboring populations, the presence of the virus may actually indicate 
their connection to others.14
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Discussion
Absent from the debates about the patenting of Hagahai DNA is any 
consideration of differences in how the human body is conceived in 
Melanesian and Euro-American contexts. Kopy toff (1996: 64-65) has noted 
that human bodies are treated as potential property in many cultural contexts. 
Since the abolition of slavery, the United States legal system no longer 
recognizes property interests in the body (Greely, 1998:488), demarcating 
a significant limit to property regimes in the US.15 However, United States 
patent law treats human DNA no differently than other complex organic
1 4 .These relationships are indicative of the general problem associated with the assignation 
of property rights to groups: how to delineate appropriate boundaries. Who owns kava, 
for example, the root used in Fiji, Vanuatu and other parts of the Pacific to produce an 
intoxicating beverage that has both ceremonial significance and iconic status for identity? 
Despite the large number o f potential claimants, the circulation of kava beyond this 
region is often described as an infringement on cultural property rights (Puri, 2001). 
Cultural property rights claims commonly make reference to objects or ideas that 
historically have a broader distribution. Exclusive claims to cultural property can only be 
fashioned by arbitrarily privileging the rights of one group while excluding competing 
claims. This is comparable to what Strathern (1996), in reference to scientific authorship 
and claims to invention, calls “cutting the network”.
15.Kimbrell (1996: 135) points out that US restrictions on “patenting human beings [are] 
based on the Thirteenth Amendment o f the Constitution, the antislavery amendment, 
which prohibits ownership of a human being”. Similar restrictions apply within British 
common law. These ideas may be changing. Court cases in the US and the UK on posthumous 
requests to use the gametes of a deceased relative for procreative processes have raised 
challenging questions about the right to inherit genetic material as property (Strathern, 
1999).
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chemicals.16 Genetic material is relegated to the biological commons and the 
individual donor is not recognized as having sustained a loss if it is patented 
or otherwise claimed as property. In contrast, UNESCO maintains that the 
human genome is part of the shared heritage of humanity and consequently 
objects to property claims and other efforts to profit from human genetic 
material (Greely, 1998: 489-90).
Euro-American concerns about the appropriateness of treating the 
body or body parts as property may be contrasted with Melanesian ideas 
about bodies and transactions. Many societies in Papua New Guinea recognize 
specific male and female contributions to procreation, commonly identified 
as bones and blood. These contributions create entitlements that are realized 
in the form of limited claims on one’s offspring and what they produce. 
People also make claims on the accomplishments of other persons and their 
offspring by virtue of bridewealth contributions that make reproduction 
socially possible. The resulting claims to other persons and their productive 
capacities are largely incompatible with Euro-American assumptions about 
the “possessive individual” derived from Lockean conceptions of labor and 
property (Macpherson, 1962). Nor are Melanesian notions of entitlement 
made on the basis of axiomatic or “natural” claims to membership within a 
particular social group. In contrast to Euro-American conceptions of the 
body, the individual, and society as universal and natural categories, in 
Melanesia the rights to bodies are socially produced through exchange.17
An individual’s genetic material is simultaneously a singular configuration 
and the outcome of overlapping genetic histories. Euro-American debates 
about the ownership of Hagahai DNA were divided in part along these lines. 
Even where the individual is colloquially conceived as a bounded unit, genetic 
material might be seen to belong to either a particular person or to the 
genetic commons. But with respect to indigenous communities, the same 
material was seen to belong to a particular group or population.
None of these efforts to impose appropriate limits to property regimes 
accommodates Melanesian treatment of the body in terms of investments
16. Exceptions are granted for inventions that are regarded as contravening “public morality” 
(Greely, 1998: 489).
1 7 .Strathern (2001: 162) describes Melanesian sociality in these terms: “everyone is enmeshed 
in a set of relationships predicated on exchanges of wealth between persons in recognition 
of the bodily energy and activities persons bestow on one another”.
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from parents, contributions to bridewealth, and other transactions. While 
the patent of the Hagahai cell line was vigorously opposed by Melanesian 
public intellectuals (e.g., Liloqula, 1996; Sengi, 1996), when the Hagahai 
were asked to comment, they focused on their relationship to the 
anthropologist associated with the patent (Ibeji and Gane, 1996). They viewed 
the proposed transactions in terms of the social practices through which 
persons make claims on one another, organizing productivity and the flow 
of valuables in relation to the circulation of bodily substances.The debates 
about the patenting of Hagahai DNA were carried out in terms of rights that 
were considered natural and a priori by their Euro-American proponents, 
rather than the kinds of contingent social relations through which comparable 
claims are negotiated in Melanesia. The decision to withdraw the Hagahai 
patent by the US National Institutes of Health was made with reference to 
questions about the appropriate limits to Euro-American property regimes 
rather than Melanesian ideas about how persons make claims on one another. 
These debates operated in terms of a limited set of understandings about 
human bodies and body parts, including Euro-American individuals, 
Melanesian groups or populations, and the concept of the biological 
commons. The Hagahai controversy was also the first public debate about 
cultural property rights in Papua New Guinea (Alpers, 1996: 32), stimulating 
the debates that are the subject of the final case discussed in this article.
Property and pollution
The next case considers property claims made in relation to the 
environment. A familiar example is the concept of natural resources, which 
is predicated on viewing certain aspects of the environment -  e.g., a stand 
of pine trees, a deposit of coal or a school of fish -  as potential property. As 
the Hagahai case suggests, biotechnology facilitates the conversion of the 
environment into natural resources at an entirely new scale, at the level 
of the genome. The following examples have an effect parallel to that of 
biotechnology, but at the opposite end of the spectrum, enabling property 
models to operate at a planetary scale. In contrast to property regimes that 
regulate the distribution of things with positive value or “goods” , this case
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is about the establishment of value in things that are harmful, what Beck
(1992) calls environmental risks or “bads”. While pollution is commonly 
conceptualized in terms of damage to property, it is now also seen to mobilize 
a kind of property right. Examples include emissions trading between power 
plants in the United States and proposals for an international market in carbon 
as the means to manage greenhouse gases and their contribution to global 
warmingAmendments to the US Clean Air Act in 1990 created a market- 
based system that was designed to reduce air pollution from power plants 
more economically than is possible through systematic regulation (Altman, 
2002: C l). Economists urged the government to target those companies 
that would have the greatest reduction in the volume of their emissions in 
relation to their expenditure on pollution controls. A power plant that bums 
coal with a high sulfur content might more economically reduce the volume 
of pollutants released into the atmosphere by installing an expensive 
“ scrubber” than a plant that burns coal with a relatively low sulfur content. 
Initial estimates of the cost to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions, the cause of 
acid rain, by ten million tons per year were as much as US$15 billion, but 
this goal was reached for substantially less. A trading company enables 
utilities to buy and sell allowances for sulfur dioxide emissions on spot and 
futures markets, effectively establishing a property right to pollute.
The response to this system has been largely favorable although 
significant problems remain. Some of the dirtiest plants considered it too 
expensive to install pollution controls and purchased the rights to continue 
high emissions of sulfur dioxide. The absence of control over the distribution 
of these plants created “hot spots” in regions overexposed to sulfur dioxide. 
Focusing markets on a single category of pollutants can exacerbate other 
environmental problems. Efforts to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions can 
increase reliance on hydroelectric power, which increases the sedimentation 
of rivers, harming fish populations (Rose, 2000). Laws that require the 
installation of modern pollution controls during equipment upgrades have 
had the perverse effect of keeping old, inefficient plants in operation, although 
recent policy changes will permit upgrades without requiring reductions in 
emissions. Some critics of these regimes argue that affected communities 
rather than corporations should have the right to distribute permits to pollute, 
which they could use or sell (Altman, 2002: C13).Comparable arrangements 
have been proposed for managing carbon dioxide, which is responsible for 
global warming. Carbon trading is one of the “Clean Development
2 0 3
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Mechanisms” proposed in the 1997 Kyoto accord. It is intended to balance 
carbon capture and emissions by establishing a system of credits and debits. 
Industrialized countries with high levels of emissions would pay corporations 
or other countries to set aside “carbon sinks”, usually in forest preserves 
where carbon can be stored.18 These initiatives establish the right to pollute 
as a form of property regulated by market forces. However, debates 
concerning the impact of the Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea reveal 
other aspects of the relationship between property and pollution.
Pollution downstream from the Ok Tedi Mine
The Ok Tedi mine was the subject of contentious litigation regarding 
its environmental impact from 1994 to 1996. Representing 34,000 plaintiffs 
from Papua New Guinea, the case was adjudicated in the Victorian Supreme 
Court in Melbourne, where Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP), the majority 
shareholder and operating partner of the mine, is incorporated (Banks and 
Ballard, 1997). The legal claims against the mine did not turn on questions 
of damage to property because the Australian courts were unable to hear 
claims about land held under customary tenure in Papua New Guinea (Gordon, 
1997: 153). Alternatively, lawyers for the plaintiffs made the novel argument 
that people living downstream from the mine had suffered a loss due to the 
mine’s impact on their subsistence economy. Judge Byrne (1995: 15) 
endorsed their claim, determining that:to restrict the duty of care to cases of 
pure economic loss would be to deny a remedy to those whose life is
1 8 .Carbon sequestration companies create monetary value for the carbon stored in trees and 
soil. Subsidies for carbon sequestration act like other subsidies for social or environmental 
goods, e.g., farming subsidies that support a fallow period for agricultural land. The 
difference is that they seek to indirectly balance undesirable processes across the planet. 
One recent carbon trade involved the payment of US$25 million to offset carbon dioxide 
released into the air by Entergy Corporation, a major electricity supplier, to farmers in 
the Pacific Northwest who agreed to use the “direct seed” method of planting. They were 
compensated for offsetting 30,000 tons of carbon dioxide released from Entergy power 
plants by avoiding plowing, which releases soil into the atmosphere and increases erosion 
(Environmental Defense, 2002).
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substantially, if not entirely, outside an economic system which uses money 
as a medium of exchange. It was put that, in the case of subsistence dwellers, 
loss of the things necessary for subsistence may be seen as akin to economic 
loss. If the plaintiffs are unable or less able to have or enjoy those things 
which are necessary for their subsistence as a result of the defendants” 
negligent conduct of the mine, they must look elsewhere for them, perhaps 
to obtain them by purchase or barter or perhaps to obtain some substitute.
The courts recognized in subsistence production a set of rights, 
relations and values comparable to those which organize the ownership of 
property in capitalist societies. The ruling established a precedent that affirmed 
subsistence rights.
An out-of-court settlement of the case against the Ok Tedi mine was 
reached in 1996. However, dissatisfaction with the implementation of the 
settlement agreement prompted the communities downstream from the mine 
to return to the courts in Melbourne in 2000. They accused BHP of violating 
its commitment to halt riverine disposal of tailings and other mine wastes, 
which have caused extensive environmental damage downstream. While 
1,400 km2 of rain forest along the Ok Tedi and Fly Rivers is already dead or 
under severe stress, the damage is expected to spread further downstream, 
eventually covering 2,040 km2 (Higgins, 2002), and potentially as much as 
3,000 km2 (Parametrix, Inc. and URS Greiner Woodward Clyde, 1999: 8). 
Changes to the river system will eventually stabilize, but local species 
composition is not expected to return to conditions before the mine, with 
much of the rain forest along the river becoming savannah grasslands 
(Chapman et al. 2000: 17). In a report commissioned by the Prime Minister 
of Papua New Guinea, the World Bank recommended the early closure of 
the Ok Tedi mine once programs to facilitate the social and economic transition 
to life after the mine are implemented. When BHP (now BHP Billiton) indicated 
its intention to withdraw from the project, both the government of Papua 
New Guinea, which relies on the Ok Tedi mine for 18 percent of its foreign 
exchange earnings, and the communities downstream, which seek additional 
compensation for damages and opportunities for development, recommended 
that the mine continue operating until 2010, by which time the ore body will 
have been exhausted (Higgins, 2002). The PNG parliament subsequently passed 
the Mining (OK Tedi Mine Continuation (Ninth Supplemental Agreement)) 
Act of 2001, establishing the conditions of BHP Billiton’s exit from the mine, 
which will continue to operate independently. BHP Billiton subsequently
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transferred its 52 percent share in the mine to the Sustainable Development 
Program Company that it established in Singapore (Crook, 2004).19
The new trust company has been described as a “poisoned chalice” 
(Evans, 2002) because it relies on the continued operation of the mine (including 
the disposal of more than 80,000 tons of mine tailings per day into local 
rivers) to pay for development programs. The primary purpose of the trust is 
to provide BHP Billiton with indemnity from future claims regarding damage 
to the environment that will result from the continued operation of the mine. 
The Mining Act limits corporate liability to the value of the trust, even though 
it is unclear whether the economic returns from BHP Billiton’s shares in the 
mine will be sufficient to offset the damages that will result. A cost-benefit 
analysis of this relationship was commissioned by the PNG government and 
completed in 2001, although the results were never made public. The Mining 
Act also provides the Ok Tedi mine with unprecedented power and authority 
to establish environmental standards for its operations and procedures for 
measuring and reporting compliance. Even given the influence of neoliberal 
economic policies that promote corporate self-regulation, the agreement 
represents an extraordinary transfer of rights from the state and ordinary 
citizens to a private company (Divecha, 2001). Despite the environmental 
problems downstream, no changes to the current operating procedures are 
planned.20 The Mining Act effectively conveys a right to pollute to the Ok Tedi 
mine in return for the transfer of BHP Billiton’s assets to the trust.
The Mining Act also legalized new arrangements between the mine 
and the affected communities, known as the Community Mine Continuation 
Agreements (CMCAs). The CMCAs refer to the rights of two groups of 
people, identified as the “land owners “and the “and users”. These categories 
are my gloss of the distinction made by the Yonggom people, who live along 
the Ok Tedi River, between ambip kin yariman, persons who own land 
along the river, and animan od yi karup, the people who derive food (animan)
1 9 .The outstanding shares in the Ok Tedi mine are held by the PNG government (30 percent, 
including 12.5 percent on behalf of the province and 2.5 percent on behalf of land-owners 
from the mine area) and 18 percent by the Canadian mining company Inmet (Ok Tedi 
Mining, 2003).
2 0 .The Ok Tedi mine has operated a dredge in the lower Ok Tedi River since 1998, but 
dredging only removes approximately one quarter of the material released into the river 
(Ok Tedi Mining, 2003).
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and money (od, also shell valuables) from the same land. Previous negotiations 
between the mine and these communities reached an impasse during the 
implementation of the 1996 settlement agreement. The mine was willing to 
provide compensation for environmental damage only to those persons who 
owned the land along the river where the damage had occurred. Lawyers 
for BHP argued that there is no provision in common law for the payment of 
compensation for damages to persons who are not the rightful property 
owners. When the lawyers for the local plaintiffs asked me to assist with 
the implementation of the settlement, I objected to the restriction that BHP 
had imposed on the payment of compensation, noting that the case had 
been argued on the basis of subsistence rights rather than damage to property. 
If only those persons identified as property owners were eligible for 
compensation, a substantial proportion of the persons who previously made 
use of the land and resources in question would be excluded. The validity of 
this argument was eventually acknowledged and the rights of both the “land 
owners” and the “land users” were included in subsequent agreements 
between the mine and the affected communities. With the passage of the 
PNG Mining Act of 2001, these categories were given the force of law, 
providing formal recognition of subsistence rights in Papua New Guinea. 
This case suggests that damages from pollution are not limited to property 
claims and that other relations between persons and land should also be 
considered.Yonggom relations to land differ from Euro-American property 
models in another respect as well.21 While the relationship between the 
yarinian and his land may be translated as ownership, it also has other 
meanings. The central actor in divinations held to seek the cause of a 
persistent illness, or anigat, is the anigat yarinian. This role is filled by the 
senior kinsman or guardian responsible for the patient’s well-being. Similarly, 
the sponsor of an arat pig feast is known as the arat yarinian. The yariman 
relationship is based on the responsibilities of kinship, guardianship and
21. Filer (1997: 162-164) has described how ideas about land ownership in Papua New Guinea 
have changed over tim e. The Tok Pisin "papa bilong graun” o f the colonial era 
characterized this relationship in the idiom of kinship. This was condensed into the term 
“papagraun" after independence in 1975, and subsequently anglicized as “landona”. In 
this form, the idiom of kinship is no longer marked. Land ownership in Papua New Guinea 
is increasingly associated with populist sentiments (Filer, 1997: 164), including protests 
against land privatisation schemes in the capital of Port Moresby.
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sponsorship. Given that ambip kin refers to both a particular bloc of land 
and the specific lineage or clan which holds the rights to that land, atnbip 
kin yariman indicates the person or persons responsible for lineage or clan 
land. This relationship has figured significantly in recent efforts by lawyers 
representing the communities located downstream from the mine to challenge 
the validity of the Community Mine Continuation Agreements.The CMCAs 
authorized any “person representing or purporting to represent a Community 
or clan” to bind its members to the agreement, “notwithstanding (...) that there 
is no express authority for that person to sign or execute the Community Mine 
Continuation Agreement on behalf of the members of the Community or 
clan concerned” . This would legally commit the members of the village to 
the agreement without necessarily having secured their consent. The members 
of future generations would also be bound by the agreement. Among the 
provisions of the CMCAs was the obligation to “opt out” of continuing legal 
action against the mine, which seeks to enforce the terms of the 1996 
settlement agreement, including the requirement to implement the most 
practicable form of tailings containment. The lawyers for BHP Billiton included 
this provision in the CMCAs in order to facilitate the corporate exit from the 
Ok Tedi project by discouraging the people living downstream from the mine 
from participating in the lawsuit.
A hearing was scheduled in Melbourne in February, 2002 to evaluate 
the request for an injunction against the implementation of the CMCAs. In 
advance of these proceedings, the lawyers representing the communities 
downstream from the mine asked me to provide expert advice regarding the 
relationship between the political authority of elected or appointed officials 
in contemporary villages and the rights to land held under customary land 
tenure systems recognized by PNG law. Most of the villages downstream 
from the Ok Tedi mine were established during the colonial era. The 
authorization of a village representative to bind the members of that village 
on matters concerning the disposition of land threatens to bypass the 
provisions of customary land tenure. It is a requirement of customary law 
in Papua New Guinea that decisions concerning land that is held under 
customary tenure must incorporate the views of all of those persons who 
have ownership rights to the land in question.
In contrast to land-owners, village representatives acquire their 
political authority from the government or other electoral processes. They 
lack authority over the disposition of land, which among the Yonggom is
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held by individuals in association with particular lineages or clans rather 
than by the village or community as a whole. Given that the Community 
Mine Continuation Agreements are fundamentally concerned with damage 
to local land and rivers, they necessarily invoke customary land rights. 
In documents prepared for the hearing in February, 2002, I argued that 
village representatives, even if democratically elected, lack the authority to 
bind other persons to decisions affecting the disposition of their land. 
Consequently, it was my view that the signatories to the CMCAs did not 
have the authority to commit the other members of their village or community 
to the agreement, including the obligation to “opt out” of the on-going 
lawsuit.Immediately prior to the February hearing on the validity of the 
CMCAs, lawyers for BHP Billiton and the Ok Tedi mine agreed not to enforce 
the contested provision of the CMCAs that would require the people living 
downstream from the mine to “opt out” of the legal action without first 
providing the lawyers for the plaintiffs with sufficient notice to return the 
matter to the courts for review. In effect, the lawyers for the Ok Tedi mine 
and BHP Billiton temporarily conceded to the injunction sought by the lawyers 
for the plaintiffs. This agreement allows for the continued participation of 
the people living on the Ok Tedi and Fly Rivers in their legal action against 
BHP Billiton and the Ok Tedi mine.
Discussion
The examples from the Ok Tedi case suggest that Euro-American 
property models fail to register the social consequences of pollution, including 
impacts on subsistence practices. They do not accommodate local 
constructions of responsibility towards the land and they remain at odds 
with customary land tenure. Yet by contesting Euro-American assumptions 
about property in the courts and by seeking compensation from the mine 
for pollution, the Yonggom and their neighbors accepted a particular view 
of “nature” as a legitimate object of human management. Implicit in this 
perspective is the assumption that development is a fundamental good (see 
Crook, 2004). The result is the transformation of their environment into an 
object of science, planning and politics (see Scott, 1998).
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The debates about the future of the Ok Tedi mine also invoke the 
“tragedy of the commons” argument that privatisation promotes sustainable 
resource use (Hardin, 1968). The threat of environmental degradation is 
used to justify private property, which is naturalized as the most efficient 
form of stewardship. Yet privatisation can also lead to environmental 
degradation (Feeny et al. 1990). In the Ok Tedi case, the mine mobilized 
new property rights to pollute even though it was responsible for the 
environmental problems downstream. Despite its shortcomings, the “tragedy 
of the commons” model remains influential and has even been applied to 
planetary levels in calls for the management of the “global commons” as the 
solution to international environmental problems (Goldman, 1998). The 
resulting vision of the planet as a single ecosystem raises important questions 
about the recognition of different social interests (Milton, 1996).
While the view derived from Locke (1960 [1698]) is that property is 
created through the addition of labor to nature, these new forms of property 
mobilize the right to add pollution to the environment. Their emergence 
substantiates Beck’s (1992) claims about the reorganization of modernity 
around the management of environmental risks. The Ok Tedi case challenges 
the “ tragedy of the commons” argument that increased propertisation is 
the most efficient means of addressing the problems of environmental 
degradation.22
Property in culture
Proposals for recognizing cultural property rights represent a powerful 
set of conventions. The timing of these initiatives has already been noted. The 
World Trade Organization has imposed a standardized intellectual property regime 
(TRIPS) at the international level, which simultaneously protects Disney cartoons, 
textbooks and novels, patents on pharmaceuticals and innovations in
2 2 .The US Environmental Protection Agency has recently proposed a pollution credit 
trading program for water, which would provide mining companies with the option of 
purchasing pollution credits instead of limiting the discharge of tailings and other mine 
wastes into local waterways (Perks and Wetstone, 2003: 15-16).
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biotechnology. Critics have noted that TRIPS may require developing countries 
to purchase the modified fonns of material that they previously used without 
restriction. This is the case for certain pharmaceuticals and genetically engineered 
varieties of seed, for which their contribution to the original form of the commodity 
is not legally recognized (Shiva and Holla-Bhar, 1996).
Proposals to protect cultural property rights are intended in part to 
correct these imbalances by providing legal protection to communities that 
is comparable to what is available to corporations. Whereas disputes about 
cultural property rights are increasingly common in North America (Brown, 
2003) and Australia (Kalinoe, 2004) they remain largely hypothetical in Papua 
New Guinea. Consequently this section of the article addresses general 
debates about cultural property rights rather than a particular case study.
A fundamental weakness of initiatives designed to protect cultural 
property rights is the tension between their universalist scope and local projects 
and concerns. The language used by UNESCO, WIPO and other multilateral 
agencies is framed in oppositional terms, following generalizations about the 
differences between Euro-Americans and indigenous peoples, including private 
versus collective forms of ownership, interest in commodification versus 
relations organized through reciprocity, and individual creativity versus inherited 
traditions. These binary oppositions beg the question of cultural difference 
among indigenous peoples. Their interpretation of tradition also perpetuates 
stereotypes about their cultural conservatism, ignoring their capacity for 
innovation and invention.
Objections to cultural property rights typically operate at the level of the 
universal as well. One concern is the need to protect the “cultural commons”, 
the objects and ideas that have already entered the public domain (Brown, 
1998: 198; see also Brush, 1999). Limiting access to cultural property may be 
incommensurate with liberal political values that emphasize the free exchange 
of ideas and information, although comparable mechanisms to protect intellectual 
property are regularly used to defend corporate interests. There are also practical 
impediments to the assignation of ownership rights when multiple and overlapping 
claims exist (see note 14). These problems include the definition of membership 
within particular communities. Brown, (1998: 204) urges caution with respect 
to proposals that would empower the stale or multilateral bodies to monitor 
genre boundaries or police ethnic identity. Regulations or policies designed to 
benefit particular cultural groups might also be exploited by corporations or 
other parties to the detriment of the communities whom the policies were originally
211
PROPERTY LIMITS
intended to support (Dominguez, 2001: 183). The potential for corporate abuse 
of cultural property rights schemes has led some NGOs to argue that they 
should be seen as a plot of the powerful rather than a potential “weapon of the 
weak” (Tauli-Corpuz, 1999).
The transaction costs associated with formal systems for regulating 
cultural property rights would also impose significant constraints on the 
sharing of ideas (Brush, 1996: 661-63). An interesting proposal to mitigate 
this concern involves restricting the scope of cultural property rights to 
commercial applications (Rosen, 1997: 255-59). These more limited domains 
might be more amenable to tailored solutions (ibid: 256). While this would 
presumably reduce the general threat to the public domain or “cultural 
commons” , it would be incommensurate with Melanesian expectations, 
which include the right to withdraw material from circulation and to limit or 
restrict access to secret or sacred cultural property (Kalinoe, 2004). Even if 
cultural property rights could be successfully mediated by the market, 
structural limitations might prevent these procedures from benefiting the 
very communities whose interests they are intended to serve. Dove (1994: 2) 
relates the Southeast Asian parable of the peasant who finds a diamond but 
is obligated to sell the gem to his local patron, who pays him but a fraction 
of the stone’s value and profits enormously when the stone is resold.23 
Dove argues that the communities that cultural property rights proposals 
are designed to protect generally lack the knowledge, political resources 
and economic networks required to take advantage of the opportunities 
seemingly afforded to them. Development at the local level is contingent on
23. Parables should not be mistaken for history. Consider a contrasting account from Papua 
New Guinea, describing historical events rather than fiction. During the peak of the Mt. 
Kare gold rush, during which thousands of Highlanders staked out individual claims and 
ex tracted  gold worth m illions o f do lla rs (Vail, 1993), a fa ther-and-son team  of 
entrepreneurs from Australia flew to Mt Hagen, intending to buy gold at low prices from 
“natives” who were ignorant of its true value. Several weeks later, the pair complained 
bitterly  to the media about their experiences, for they had spent their life savings 
purchasing brass shavings from enterprising Hageners, who misrepresented the metal as 
gold from Mt Kare. At issue is not whether Papua New Guineans are more resourceful 
than Indonesian peasants, but whether local options should be constrained on the basis 
of a parable. Nor is it clear whether the act of finding a stone is an appropriate analogue 
for the accumulation of indigenous knowledge.
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the reform of the political and economic conditions responsible for inequality. 
Dove (1996) also suggests that payments for cultural property rights would 
erode and ultimately destroy the basis on which these communities produce 
anything of significant value to the rest of the world, their underlying 
difference.24 However, this argument is tenable only if local agency is ignored, 
including widespread Melanesian desires for greater participation in the global 
economy.
An alternative to the formulation of universal models for cultural 
property rights is to develop policies or legislation that build on local precedents. 
Arguments about cultural property rights are usually framed by the problems 
of Euro-American profiting (or profiteering) from the restricted ownership 
of knowledge and things in the forms in which they are produced, while 
denying comparable rights to persons and communities in places such as 
Papua New Guinea. Yet the motive for establishing cultural property rights 
is not simply to bring indigenous ownership in line with Euro-American 
options by providing the same legal rights to Motuans over their tattoos that 
Disney has over its cartoons, or controls over certain varieties of sago to 
their cultivators that biotech firms have over the hybrid seeds that they 
produce. For example, an early proposal by two Papua New Guinean public 
intellectuals sought to use customary claims of ownership to limit the 
performance of particular songs and dances to group members, rather than 
licensing them for use by others (Kalinoe and Simet, 1999). Could Melanesian 
ways of investing in relationships and recognizing multiple ownership serve 
as the basis for protecting local knowledge and practices? This would require 
cultural property rights policy or legislation to take the form of Melanesian 
claims to what they produce, use and transact. This is the premise of sui 
generis systems of cultural property rights, as Kalinoe (2004) argues. While 
recognizing indigenous mechanisms for protecting cultural property rights 
might enrich Euro-American legal discourses (Rosen, 1997: 258; Barron, 
1998), in practice “a sui generis system developed in Papua New Guinea 
would be virtually useless in protecting the exploitation of traditional 
knowledge elsewhere in the world, unless other countries agree to adopt 
similar laws” (Busse and Whimp, 2000: 24).
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24. Dove (1996) writes about biodiversity; the reference to culture is mine.
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Discussion
These debates reify culture in relation to property claims. While Hamson
(1993) identified parallels between the Euro-American category of intellectual 
property and Melanesian traffic in ritual knowledge, he subsequently observed 
that most cultural property has undergone a transformation from “goods” 
into “legacies”, the value of which is largely associated with the past (Harrison, 
2000). More generally, Dominguez (1992) and Jackson (1995) have described 
the hegemonic effects of the Euro-American concept of culture, which leads 
to the reproduction of local beliefs and practices in relation to imported 
categories. One consequence of this process is that only select aspects of 
local lives are recognized as “cultural”, while the remainder are ignored. Claims 
to cultural property are shaped by Euro-American conceptions of culture, 
including the emphasis on performance.
Local alternatives to the concept of culture include the Tok Pisin 
term pasin or “fashion”, analogous to ethos (Sykes, 2001: 3-8). Kcistam or 
“custom” refers to a codified and generally oppositional form of collective 
self-reference (Keesing, 1989). The Motu equivalent is kara, or “way”. 
These concepts are largely ignored by cultural property rights discourse. 
To ensure their recognition by universalist proposals to protect cultural and 
intellectual property rights, Melanesian ideas and practices must be 
represented in language that is commensurate with Euro-American standards 
(Busse and Whimp, 2000: 24; see Povinelli, 2002).
Conclusions
Property claims now extend from the molecular to the planetary. 
Claims to cultural property are similarly pervasive (see Brown, 2003). 
Paradoxically, the expansion of property claims occurs at a time when 
challenges to the conventional justifications for property regimes are also 
on the rise. While patents are seen to provide economic rewards for creativity 
and capital investment, recent studies have questioned their efficacy in
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stimulating innovation (Nelson and Mazzoleni, 1997).25 Other research 
challenges the widespread assumption that the standardization of property 
rights by the state facilitates economic development (van Meijl and von 
Benda-Beckmann, 1999). Property regimes may also constrain new economic 
opportunities by placing “needless restrictions on securities transfer and 
capitalist expansion” (Maurer, 1999: 365-66).
Despite these negative appraisals of property regimes, new efforts to 
mobilize the kinds of protections afforded to authors, inventors and 
corporations to culture have been proposed by multilateral organizations 
and NGOs. Critics of these proposals question whether these measures are 
in the best interests of the communities that they are intended to benefit. 
Also at issue is whether property can be both the cause and the solution to 
social and economic problems.
The resulting debates over the appropriate limits to property regimes 
operate in terms of familiar Euro-American categories, including the body, nature 
and culture. Whereas Euro-American claims to genetic material are made in 
terms of individual rights, the ownership of genetic material from indigenous 
peoples is collectively attributed. Alternatively, the human genome may be treated 
as part of the biological commons. Yet these views exclude Melanesian 
understandings of the body that emphasize transactions between persons.
With regard to the relationship between property and pollution, 
arguments derived from the “tragedy of the commons” model assert that 
privatisation is the most appropriate response to the challenges of sustainable 
resource use. The expansion of the commons leads to contradictory 
applications of the property construct in the creation of positive value in the 
form of natural resources and negative value through pollution. The use of 
property rights to manage both production and destruction is challenged by 
many communities in arguments about the value of place (Escobar, 2001), 
including ideas about kinship and belonging that may invoke the duty of 
care. However, even these objections may render “nature” the legitimate 
object of human management.
25. For example, the economic benefits conferred by patents may discourage innovation in 
the pharmaceutical industry by providing economic incentives to companies for making 
small modifications to established drugs when their patents expire, rather than expending 
resources to develop new medicines.
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Conventions for recognizing some forms of cultural property are 
already in place. The legitimacy of heritage protection, including sacred 
sites, art and other material manifestations of culture is widely recognized. 
These practices are institutionalized to the point of nation-making in museums. 
However, at the margins of this process are intangible forms of heritage, 
including music, dance and other performance genres, whose standing as 
cultural property remains contested (although see UNESCO, 2003). Cultural 
property claims operating at the more abstract level of ideas, designs and 
language are increasingly seen to be impracticable and undesirable, if not 
potentially detrimental (Brown, 2003). Yet in Melanesia, these conventions 
and the debates they engender have the consequence of reifying the Euro- 
American concept of culture.In Property and Persuasion, Rose (1994) 
reminds us that property claims depend on the effective communication of 
possession. When the objects of property claims “seem to resist clear 
demarcation”, which is the case for ideas, elaborate systems of registration 
are required, including patents and copyrights (ibid: 17). Definitional agreement 
must precede the recognition of property claims.
These concerns are clearly relevant to the histories of people on the 
margins of common law, as they were the basis for claims of adverse 
possession supported by assertions like terra nullius, in which indigenous 
land claims were not deemed to rise to the level of property. In the debates 
on property limits discussed here, it is notable that while the same communities 
may now be engaged participants, they still bear the “burden for social 
commensuration” (Povinelli, 2001: 329-30). To assert or object to particular 
property claims, they must acknowledge the entities that are invoked.
Examination of these debates in the context of Melanesia, where the 
language and practices of transactions operate according to assumptions 
that challenge Euro-American property models, reveals a significant 
consequence of the globalization of property forms. While the debates 
described here represent important political struggles over the appropriate 
limits to property regimes, they operate in terms of Euro-American categories 
of the body, nature and culture that travel along with property, and thus 
potentially limit the very means by which property claims might be made or 
contested.
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Resumo
A aplicação do conceito anglo-americano de propriedade está se 
expandindo exponencialmente. Novas formas de propriedade têm sido 
propostas pelas ciências da vida para a informação genética, por governos e 
Organizações Não Governamentais (ONGs) para o direito de poluir, e por 
organizações multilaterais para a cultura. Entretanto, essas demandas novas 
por propriedade precipitaram debates sobre os limites apropriados para 
regimes de propriedade. Uma conseqüência não intencional desses debates, 
contudo, tem sido a promoção dos conceitos anglo-americanos de corpo, 
natureza e cultura. São acionados exemplos da Melanésia, onde a língua das 
transações desafia as pressuposições que dão suporte aos modelos euro- 
americanos de propriedade. O artigo examina debates sobre uma patente 
para uma linha de célula humana, o gerenciamento da poluição de uma mina 
de cobre e ouro, e se a cultura pode ser apropriada.
Abstract
The application of the Euro-American concept of property is expanding 
exponentially. New forms of property have been proposed by the life sciences 
for genetic information, by both governments and NGOs for the right to 
pollute, and by multilateral organizations for culture. Yet these new claims 
to ownership have precipitated debates about the appropriate limits to property 
regimes. An unintended consequence of these debates, however, has been 
to promote Euro-American concepts of the body, nature and culture. 
Examples are drawn from Melanesia, where the language of transactions 
challenges the assumptions that underlie Euro-American property models. 
This article examines debates about a patent for a human cell line, the 
management of pollution from a copper and gold mine, and whether culture 
can be owned.
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